The excessive push to take care of data integrity forced the firm to revive an exorbitant amount of knowledge
The outage last week on JPMorgan Chase's online banking site is an  Chase Online Login An example of how pushing to take care of absolute data integrity could find yourself creating big problems for companies, a veteran database analyst cautioned yesterday.

The financial services firm suffered through intermittent problems on the location for 3 days earlier this month. At one point, Chase customers couldn't perform any online banking transactions for a period of quite 24 hours.

The bank initially blamed the disruption on a 'technical issue,' but later said the issues were tied to a third-party database product wont to authenticate customer log-ins.

Curt Monash, an analyst at Monash Research, said a source with knowledge oftheincidenttold him that the outage was traced to an Oracle database employed by Chase to store user profiles and authentication data. Monash said the source, who he wouldn't identify, said that four files within the Oracle database were corrupted which the error had been replicated within the mirror copy of the database that Chase maintained for backup and recovery purposes. In all, Automated financial institution transactions valued at about $132 million were delayed by the disruption. additionally, about 1,000 automobile loan applications and another 1,000 student loan applications were lost thanks to the outage, Monash said during a blog post detailing his conversation with the source.

In an interview Thursday, Monash said Chase's problems appear to possess been exacerbated by the planning of the database. He said the incident was likely prolonged because the bank had to revive tons of knowledge that did not need to be stored within the user authentication database in the first place.

Bank databases like the one that was affected typically make sure that stored transaction data
is ACID, or Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, and Durability-compliant, and thus designed to ensure transaction integrity and data recoverability in any system
failure.

Monash said tons of the info stored on the database that crashed appears to possess been customer Web usage data that was but did not have to be ACID-
compliant. Most of that data could are stored during a separate system, he said. The excessive ACID-compliant data during this case affected the bank's ability to recover quickly from the matter, he added.

"Not everything within the user profile database needed to be added via ACID transactions," he said. It's likely that albeit a number of the online usage data had been lost, it might not have impinged on the integrity of the bank's financial dealings, he said. "At a minimum recovery would are much shorter had the info not been there," he said.

The fact that problems with one database affected the most Web portal, its Automated financial institution functions, and loan applications suggests that the merchandise was one point of failure for too many applications, Monash said.

"This was an outsized and sophisticated database that when it went bad brought down many applications," he said. it isn't clear if the advantages of tying numerous applications to one database exceeded the
risks during this case, he added Oracle didn't immediately answer an invitation for comment.

A Chase spokesman too didn't respond specifically to Monash's comments. In
an e-mail message, he said that the "long recovery process" was caused by a corruption of systems data that disabled the bank's "ability to process customer log-ins to chase.com."